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Abstract: The concept of "logical depth" introduced by Charles H. Bennett  (1988) seems to capture, at
least partially, the notion of organized complexity, so central in big history. More precisely, the increase in
organized  complexity refers  here  to  the  wealth,  variety  and  intricacy  of  structures,  and should not  be
confused with the increase of random complexity, formalized by Kolmogorov (1965). If Bennett is right in
proposing to assimilate organized complexity with "computational content", then the fundamental cause of
the increase of complexity in the universe is the existence of computing mechanisms with memory, and
able  to  cumulatively  create  and  preserve  computational  contents.  In  this  view,  the universe  computes,
remembers its calculations, and reuses them to conduct further computations. Evolutionary mechanisms are
such forms of cumulative computation with memory and we owe them the organized complexity of life.
Language,  writing,  culture,  science  and  technology  can  also  be  analyzed  as  computation  mechanisms
generating, preserving and accelerating the increase in organized complexity. The main unifying theme for
big history is the energy rate density, a metric based on thermodynamics. However useful, this metric does
not provide much insight into the role that information and computation play in our universe. The concept
of “logical depth” provides a new lens to examine the increase of organized complexity. We argue in this
paper that organized complexity is  a valid and useful  way to make sense of big history.  Additionally,
logical  depth  has  a  rigorous  formal  definition  in  theoretical  computer  science  that  hints  at  a  broader
research program to quantify complexity in the universe.
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evolution, complexity, complexification, computation, artificial life, philosophy of information
American  Philosophical  Association  Newsletter  on  Philosophy  and  Computers 17 (2):  49–54.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07111 
1 Introducton
The core concept of big history is the increase of complexity  (Christian 2004).
Currently, it is mainly explained and analyzed within a thermodynamic framework, with
the concept of energy rate density (Chaisson 2001; 2011). 
However,  even  if  energy  is  universal,  it  doesn’t  capture  informational  and
computational  dynamics,  central  in  biology,  language,  writing,  culture,  science  and
technology. Energy is, by definition, not an informational concept. Energy can produce
poor  or  rich  interactions;  it  can  be  wasted  or  used  with  care.  The  production  of
computation by unit  of energy varies  sharply,  from device to  device.  For example,  a
compact disc player produces much less computation per unit of energy than a regular
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laptop. Furthermore, Moore's law shows that from computer to computer, the energy use
per computation decreases quickly with each new generation of microprocessor.
Since the emergence of life, living systems have evolved memory mechanisms
(RNA,  DNA,  neurons,  culture,  technologies)  storing  information  about  complex
structures.  In  that  way,  evolution  needs  not  to  start  from  scratch,  but  can  build  on
previously memorized structures.  Evolution is thus a cumulative process based on useful
information,  not  on  energy,  in  the  sense  that  energy is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient.
Informational  and computational  metrics  are  needed to  measure  and understand such
mechanisms. 
We take a computational view on nature, in the tradition of digital  philosophy
(e.g.  Zuse  1970;  Chaitin  2006;  Lloyd  2005;  Wolfram  2002;  Floridi  2003).  In  this
framework,  cosmic  evolution  is  essentially  driven by memory mechanisms that  store
previous computational contents, on which further complexity can be built. 
We first give a short history of information theories, starting with Shannon, but
focusing on algorithmic information theory, which goes much further. We then elaborate
on the distinction between  random complexity, formalized by Kolmogorov  (1965), and
organized complexity, formalized by Bennett  (1988). Kolmogorov complexity (K) is a
way to measure random complexity, or the informational content of a string. It is defined
as the size of the shortest program producing such a string. 
This tool has given rise to many applications, such as automatic classification in
linguistics  (Cilibrasi  and  Vitanyi  2005;  Li  et  al.  2004),  automatic  generation  of
phylogenetic trees (Varré, Delahaye, and Rivals 1999), or to detect spam (Belabbes and
Richard 2008). 
Bennett’s  logical  depth  does  not  measure  an  informational  content,  but  a
computational content. It measures the time needed to compute a certain string S from a
short program. A short program is considered as a more probable origin of S than a long
program. Because of this central inclusion of time, a high (or deep) value in logical depth
means that the object has had a rich causal history. In this sense, it  can be seen as a
mathematical and computational formalization of the concept of history. More broadly
construed (i.e.  not  within the strict  formal  definition),  we want  to show that  modern
informational,  computational  and  algorithmic  theories  can  be  used  as  a  conceptual
toolbox to analyze, understand and explore the rise of complexity in big history.
We outline a research program based on the idea that what reflects the increase of
complexity  in  cosmic  evolution  is  the  computational  content,  that  we  propose  to
assimilate  with logical  depth,  i.e.  the  associated  mathematical  concept  proposed  by
Bennett.  We  discuss  this  idea  at  different  levels,  formally,  quasi-physically  and
philosophically.  We end the paper with a discussion of issues related to this research
program.
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2 A very short history of informaton theories
2.1 Shannon informaton theory
The  Shannon  entropy  (Shannon  1948) of  a  sequence  S  of  n characters  is  a
measure of the information content of S when we suppose that every character C has a
fixed probability pr(C) to be in position i (the same for every position). That is:
If we know only this probabilistic information about S, it is not possible to compress the
sequence S in another sequence of bits of length less then H(S).  Actual compression
algorithms applied to texts do search and use many other regularities beyond the relative
frequency of letters. This is why Shannon entropy does not give the real minimal length
in  bits  of  a  possible  compressed  version  of  S.  This  minimal  length  is  given  by the
Kolmogorov complexity of S that we will now introduce. 
2.2 Algorithmic informaton theory 
Since 1965, we’ve seen a renewal of informational and computational concepts,
well  beyond  Shannon’s  information  theory.  Ray  Solomonoff,  Andreï  Kolmogorov
(1965), Leonid Levin, Pier Martin-Löf (1966), Gregory Chaitin, Charles Bennett are the
first  contributors of this new science  (see Li and Vitányi 2008 for details),  which is
based on the mathematical theory of computability born with Alan Turing in the 1930s.
The Kolmogorov complexity  K(S) of  a  string  S is  the  length  of  the  smallest
program S* written in binary code and for a universal computer that produces S. This is
the absolute  informational  content  or incompressible  information content  of S,  or the
algorithmic entropy of S.
Kolmogorov complexity is also called interchangeably  informational content or
incompressible  informational  content or  algorithmic  entropy or  Kolmogorov-Chaitin
algorithmic complexity or program-size complexity. 
The  invariance  theorem  states  that  K(S)  does  not  really  depend  on  the  used
programming  language,  provided  the  language  is  universal  (capable  to  define  every
computable function).
The  Kolmogorov  complexity  is  maximal  for  random  sequences:  a  random
sequence  cannot  be  compressed.  This  is  why  K(S)  is  sometimes  called  random
complexity of S.
2.3 Logical depth - Computatonal content 
Kolmogorov complexity is an interesting and useful concept, but it is an error to
believe that it measures the value of the information contained in S. Not all information is
useful:  for  example,  the  information  in  a  sequence  of  heads  and  tails  generated  by
throwing a coin is totally useless. Indeed, if a program needs to use a random string,
another random string would also do the job, which means that the particular random
string chosen is not important. Kolmogorov complexity is a useful notion for defining the
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absolute  notion of  a  random sequence  (Martin-Löf 1966),  but  it  is  not  capturing  the
notion of organized complexity. 
Charles H. Bennett has introduced another notion, the "logical depth of S". It tries
to  measure  the  real  value  of  the  information  contained  in  S,  or  as  he  proposed  its
"computational content" (to be opposed to its 'informational content"). A first attempt to
formulate Bennett’s idea is to say that the logical depth of S, LD(S) is the time it takes for
the shortest program of S, S*, to produce S. A more detailed study and discussion about
the formulation can be found in (Bennett 1988).
Various  arguments  have  been  formulated  that  make  plausible  that  indeed  the
logical depth of Bennett, LD(S), is a measure of the computational content of S, or of the
quantity of non trivial structures in S. To contrast it to "random complexity", we say that
it is a measure of "organized complexity". 
An important property of LD(S) is the slow growth’s law (see Bennett 1988): an
evolutionary system S(t) cannot have its logical depth LD(S(t)) that grows suddenly. 
This property (which is not true for the Kolmogorov complexity) seems to correspond to
the intuitive  idea that  in an evolutionary  process,  whether  it  is  biological,  cultural  or
technological, the creation of new innovative structures cannot be quick.
Variants of logical depth have been explored (Lathrop and Lutz 1999; Antunes et
al. 2006; Doty and Moser 2007), as well as other similar ideas, such as  sophistication
(Koppel  1987;  1995;  Koppel  and Atlan  1991;  Antunes  and Fortnow 2003),  facticity
(Adriaans  2009;  2012) or  effective  complexity  (Gell-Mann  and  Lloyd  1996;  2004).
Studies have established properties of these measures, and have discussed them (Antunes,
Souto, and Teixeira 2012; Bloem, Rooij, and Adriaans 2015). Importantly, results show
that these various notions are closely related (Ay, Muller, and Szkola 2010; Antunes et al.
2016). In this paper we focus on logical depth, whose definition is general, simple and
easy to understand.
3 Outline of a research program
3.1 Three levels of analysis
Let  us  first  distinguish  three  conceptual  levels  of  the  notion of  computational
content: mathematical, quasi-physical and philosophical. 
First, we presented the notion of computational content as the logical depth, as
defined by Bennett. Other formal definitions of computational content may be possible,
but this one has proven to be robust. This definition has been applied to derive  a method
to classify and characterize the complexity of various kinds of images (Zenil, Delahaye,
and Gaucherel 2012). More applications promise to be successful, in the same way as
Kolmogorov complexity proved useful. 
Second,  we  have  the  quasi-physical  level,  linking  computation  theory  with
physics (Bennett 2012; Feynman 1998). This has not yet been developed in a satisfactory
manner.  Maybe  this  would  require  physics  to  consider  a  fundamental  notion  of
computation, in the same way as it integrated the notion of information (used for example
in thermodynamics). The transfer of purely mathematical or computer science concepts
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into  physics  is  a  delicate  step.  Issues  relate  for  example  to  the  thermodynamics  of
computation,  the  granularity  of  computation  we  look  at,  or  the  design  of  hardware
architectures actually possible physically. 
The concept of thermodynamic depth introduced by Seth Lloyd et Heinz Pagels
(1988) is defined as "the amount of entropy produced during a state's actual evolution". It
is a first attempt to translate Bennett’s  idea in a more physical  context.  However the
definition is rather imprecise and it seems not really possible to use it in practice. It is not
even clear that it reflects really the most important features of the mathematical concept,
since "thermodynamical depth can be very system dependant: some systems arrive at a
very trivial  state through much dissipation; others at very non trivial  states with little
dissipation" (Bennett 1990, 142).
Third, the philosophical level brings the bigger picture. It captures the idea that
building complexity takes time and interactions (computation time). Objects measured
with a deep computational content necessarily have a rich causal history. It thus reflects a
kind of historical complexity. Researchers in various fields have already recognized its
use  (Gell-Mann 1994;  Danchin  2003;  Mitchell  2009;  Mayfield  2013;  Steinhart  2014;
Dessalles, Gaucherel, and Gouyon 2016).
This philosophical level may also hint at a theory of value based on computational
content (Steinhart 2014, chap. 73; Delahaye and Vidal 2018). For example, a library has a
huge computational content, because it is the result of many brains who worked to write
books. Burning a library can thus be said to be unethical. 
3.2 Computer simulatons
A major  development  of  modern  science  is  the  use  of  computer  simulations.
Simulations are essential tools to explore dynamical and complex interactions that cannot
be explored with simple equations. Since the most important and interesting scientific
issues  are  complex,  simulations  will  likely  be used more and more systematically  in
science (Vidal 2008).
The difficulty with simulations is often to interpret the results. We propose that
Kolmogorov  complexity  (K)  and logical  depth  (LD)  would  be  valuable  tools  to  test
various hypotheses relative to the growth of complexity. Approximations of K and LD
have  already  been  applied  to  classify  the  complexity  of  animal  behavior.  These
algorithmic methods do validate experimental results obtained with traditional cognitive-
behavioural methods (Zenil, Marshall, and Tegnér 2015).  
For an application of K-complexity and LD to an artificial life simulation, see for
example  the  work  of  Gaucherel  (2014),  comparing  a  Lamarkian  algorithm  with  a
Darwinian algorithm in an artificial  life simulation.  Gaucherel proposes the following
three-step methodology:
(1) identification of the shortest program able to numerically model the studied system
(also called the Kolmogorov–Solomonoff complexity); (2) running the program, once if
there are no stochastic components in the system, several times if stochastic components
are there; and (3) computing the time needed to generate the system with LD complexity.
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More  generally,  in  the  domain  of  Artificial  Life,  it  is  fundamental  to  have  metric
monitoring if the complexity of the simulated environment really increases. Testing the
logical depth of entities in virtual environments would prove very useful.
3.3 Emergy and logical depth
In  systems  ecology,  an  energetic  counterpart  to  the  notion  of  computational
content has been proposed. It is called emergy (with an “m”) and is defined as the value
of a system, be it living, social or technological, as measured by the solar energy that was
used to make it (e.g. Odum 2007).  This is very similar to the logical depth, defined by
the quantity of computation that needs to be performed to make a structured object. 
Does this mean that energetic content (emergy) and computational content are one
and the same thing? No, and one argument amongst many others is that the energetic
content  to  produce  a  computation  diminishes  tremendously  with  new generations  of
computers (c.f.  Moore’s law). 
4 Discussion
We formulate here a few questions that the reader may have, and propose some answers.
Before  the emergence of  life,  does  cosmic evolution produces  any computational
content?
Yes,  but  the  memorization  of  calculus  is  non-existent  or  very  limited.  A
computation does not necessarily mean a computation with memorization. For example,
atoms such as H or molecules such as H2O are all the same, there is no memory of what
has happened to a particular atom or molecule. What lacks in these cases is computation
with a memory mechanism. 
The increase of complexity accelerates with the emergence of more and more
sophisticated  and reliable  memory mechanisms.  In this  computational  view,  the main
cosmic  evolution  threshold  is  the  emergence  of  life,  because  it  creates  a  memory
mechanism  in  the  universe  (RNA/DNA).  From  a  cosmic  perspective,  complexity
transitions  have  decelerated  from the  Big  Bang  to  the  origin  of  life,  and  started  to
accelerate since life appeared (Aunger 2007). The emergence of life thus constitutes the
tipping point in the dynamics of complexity transitions.
Furthermore, evolutionary transitions are marked with progress in the machinery
to manipulate information, particularly regarding the  memorization of information. For
example, we can think of RNA/DNA, nervous systems, language, writing, and computers
as successive revolutions in information processing (Dawkins 1995).
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Why would evolution care about minimal-sized programs?
We care about short programs, not necessarily minimally-sized programs proven
to be so. The shortest  program (or a near shortest  program) producing S is  the most
probable origin for S. Let us illustrate this point with a short story. Imagine that you walk
in the forest, and find engraved on a tree trunk 1,000,000 digits of π, written in binary
code. What is the most probable explanation of this phenomenon? There are 2  1  000  000
strings of the same size, so the chance explanation has to be excluded. The first plausible
explanation is rather that it is a hoax. Somebody computed digits of π, and engraved them
here.  If a human did not do it,  a physical mechanism may have done it,  that we can
equate with a short program producing π. The likely origin of the digits of π is a short
program producing them, not a long program of the kind print(S), which would have a
length of about one million.  
Another  example  from  the  history  of  science  is  the  now  refuted  idea  of
spontaneous generation  (Strick 2000). From our computational perspective, it would be
extremely improbable that sophisticated and complex living systems would appear in a
few days. The slow growth law says that they necessarily needed time to appear.
Couldn’t you have a short program computing for a long time, with a trivial output,
which would mean that a trivial structure would have a deep logical depth? 
Of course, programs computing a long time and producing a trivial  output are
easy to write. For example, it is easy to write a short program, computing for a long time,
and producing a sequence of 1000 zeros. This long computation wouldn’t give the logical
depth the string, because there also a shorter program computing much more rapidly and
producing these 1000 zeros. This means that objects with a deep logical depth can’t be
trivial. 
Why focus on decompression times and not compression times? 
The compression time is the time necessary to resolve a problem: knowing S, find
the shortest (or a near shortest) program producing S. 
By  contrast,  the  decompression  time  is  the  time  necessary  to  produce  the
sequence S from a near  shortest  program that  produces S.  It  is  thus a  very different
problem from compression.
If we imagine that the world contains many explicit or implicit programs —and
we certainly can think our world as a big set of programs producing objects— then the
probability of an encounter with a sequence S depends only on the time necessary for a
short program to produce S (at first glance, only short program exist).
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Complexity should be defined dynamically, not statically.
A measure is by definition something static, at one point in time. However, we
can compare two points in time, and thus study the relative LD, and the dynamics of
organized complexity.
Let us take a concrete example. What is the difference in LD-complexity between
a living and a dead body? At the time of death,  the computational  content  would be
almost the same for both. This is because the computational content measures the causal
history. A dead person still  has had a complex history. Other metrics may be used to
capture more dynamical aspects such as informational flows or energy flows. 
5 Conclusion
To sum up, we want to emphasize again that random complexity and organized
complexity are two distinct concepts. Both have strong theoretical foundations, and have
been applied to measure the complexity of particular strings. More generally, they can be
applied in practice to assess the complexity of some computer simulations. In principle,
they may thus be applied to any physical object, given that it is modelled digitally or in a
computer simulation.
         Applied  to  big  history,  organized  complexity  suggests  that  evolution  retains
computational contents via memory mechanisms, whether they are biological, cultural or
technological. Organized complexity further indicates that major evolutionary transitions
are  linked  with  the  emergence  of  new  mechanisms  that  compute  and  memorize.  
            Somewhat ironically, complexity measures in big history have neglected history.
We have argued that the computational content, reflecting the causal history of an object
and formalized as logical depth − as defined by Bennett − is a promising complexity
metric in addition to existing energetic metrics. It may well become a general measure of
complexity.
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